Product concepts
Economics and network incentives
How customers pay, how verified work is rewarded, and how the network aligns operators over time.Two assets, two jobs
| Asset | Role | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| USDC | Requester deposits, prepaid credits, provider reimbursement, servicer margin, foundation fee | Custodied independently by one TakusenEscrow per governed domain |
| TAKU | Epoch rewards, native staking/bonding, and cross-chain token utility | Minted on one canonical reward chain and bridged between Base and the Native Chain |
How a request is charged
textmargin = floor(providerCost × servicerMarginBps / 10,000)
fee = floor(providerCost × foundationFeeBps / 10,000)
total = providerCost + margin + feeThe full request budget is split equally across selected models. For each model, Native Chain stores MaxProviderCost as the largest provider reimbursement whose all-in charge fits that share under the request's snapshotted fees. The enclave must enforce and sign that exact value. A cost at or below it requires success; a cost above it requires budget_exhausted and reimbursement is capped at the committed maximum. A host-supplied lower ceiling is an invalid, slashable receipt. The provider's authenticated response remains the cost authority; Native Chain deliberately does not govern provider price schedules.
| Destination | Amount |
|---|---|
| Servicer | provider reimbursement + servicer margin |
| Foundation treasury | foundation fee |
| Requester | unused reservation released at request finalization |
Current governed snapshot
| Parameter | Current value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Protocol revision | 6 | Versioned parameter set |
| Servicer margin | 2.5% | Applied to authenticated provider cost |
| Foundation fee | 5% | Applied to authenticated provider cost |
| Validator quorum | >2/3 | Strict stake weight |
| Authorization window | 360 blocks | Admission deadline policy |
| Execution timeout | 120 blocks | Per-attempt timeout |
| Retry limit | 3 | Governed reassignment bound |
| Minimum servicer bond | 100000 | Native atomic units |
| Minimum validator bond | 1 | Minimum active observation weight |
| Timeout slash | 1% | Evidence-backed timeout |
| Invalid receipt slash | 100% | Authenticated invalid work |
| Epoch length | 4,800 blocks | Reward and set cadence |
| Validator handoff notice | 2,400 seconds | Boundary-derived EVM scheduling window |
| Emission per epoch | 1,000,000,000 | TAKU atomic units |
| Treasury allocation | 10% | Remainder goes by production |
Current governed values. Applications should discover live capabilities and limits at runtime.
TAKU epoch emissions
At each completed Native Chain epoch, the native module creates an authorization for the fixed emissionPerEpoch. treasuryBps goes to the governed treasury; the remainder is allocated among producers by produced blocks. A native pending index exposes only unminted authorizations. The coordinator relays one to TakusenToken.mintEpoch, validators require control-plane finality for the EVM receipt, and quorum completion removes that pending index instead of rescanning all historical epochs. Flashblock or unsafe request policy can never acknowledge a reorgable reward mint.
Measure
Native Chain accounts for block production during the completed epoch.
Authorize
Finalized native state binds epoch, validator set, recipients, and amounts.
Prove
Observers provide a strict stake-quorum BDN proof for the exact domain-bound EVM digest.
Mint once
TakusenToken marks epochMinted and issues the specified amounts; a repeated epoch reverts.
At the current snapshot, 1,000,000,000 token atomic units are authorized every 4,800 blocks; 10% is allocated to treasury and 90% by production. Token decimals come from the standard ERC-20 implementation. Rewards minted on the canonical reward chain do not silently change native voting power.
Bonding, unbonding, and slashing
- Servicers must meet the governed minimum bond before they are eligible for deterministic assignment.
- Stake edits are queued at epoch boundaries; the active validator roster and voting power remain frozen during an epoch.
- Unbonding uses the governed epoch delay before stake can be withdrawn.
- A quorum-observed timeout can slash the governed percentage after the retry/reconciliation policy is satisfied.
- An authenticated invalid receipt can slash 100% under the current snapshot.
- Slashing must be evidence-backed; an ambiguous infrastructure response is persisted and reconciled rather than immediately punished.
Lock/mint and burn/release bridging
Base-to-Native Chain movement locks TAKU in TakusenBridge and emits an ordered nonce plus Native Chain recipient. Validator-local watchers follow finalized heads and contribute domain-bound lock observations through consensus vote extensions; no coordinator request starts the observation. The reverse path burns natively, receives a consensus-produced bridge-release certificate, and lets any relayer release the locked token exactly once using burnReleased replay protection. Finalized release evidence is certified back into Native state autonomously.