Architecture
System architecture
The public system model: data flow, trust boundaries, sources of truth, and failure isolation.Component map
Authorizes credit, assignment, receipts, retries, and domain-bound proofs.
Browsers, wallets, and agents submit questions and signatures.
Sessions, responsive reads, streams, idempotency, and mirrors.
Provider execution, typed output, signed receipts, and durable evidence.
Independent escrows verify proofs, move USDC, and publish results.
System components
| Component | Customer-relevant responsibility |
|---|---|
| API | Capability discovery, x402 request admission, progress streams, result reads, and evidence retrieval |
| Native consensus | Credit observation, deterministic assignment, receipt acceptance, retries, and quorum-authorized finality |
| Servicers and TEE executors | Provider calls, typed-output validation, evidence creation, and signed execution receipts |
| Independent archives | Durable, content-addressed copies of the provider exchange and execution record |
| Settlement contracts | USDC custody, proof verification, replay protection, payouts, refunds, and compact result publication |
Who owns which state
| State | Authority | Local representation |
|---|---|---|
| Session and UI records | PostgreSQL | Primary application state |
| Domain-scoped credit, reservation, assignment, receipt, retry, slash | Finalized Native Chain | PostgreSQL mirrors for reads/reconciliation |
| USDC custody and paid results | The selected domain's escrow | Observed by validators and indexed locally per domain |
| Complete provider exchanges | Content-addressed archives | Archive ID and hashes in signed receipt |
| TEE identity and PCR policy | Nitro attestation + Native Chain governance | Committed teeKeyId and validator-local watcher state |
PostgreSQL makes the product responsive and recoverable, but it is a mirror rather than settlement authority. Coordinator reconciliation compares local state with Native Chain and every governed settlement domain, including payment-inactive staged domains. An unavailable domain is isolated for ordinary reconciliation, but validator authority cannot advance past a governed domain that has not synchronized.
Separated failure domains
- The API has no validator private keys and cannot fabricate quorum authorization.
- The servicer has no validator keys and cannot assign itself arbitrary work.
- The Nitro parent sees destinations and ciphertext but TLS terminates inside the enclave.
- The enclave receives no chain or database credentials and cannot settle itself.
- Archives preserve full evidence outside enclave lifetime; receipt hashes make replacement detectable.
- Durable validator watcher cursors preserve finalized EVM observation progress across restarts.